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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Ronald John Huntsman, Sr., appeals from the judgment entered upon the 
summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Underlying Criminal Proceedings 
In March 2005, Ronald Huntsman and Larry Hanslovan kidnapped Kyle 
Quinton and Becky Boden and took them to Barbara Dehl's house, where 
Hanslovan, Huntsman and Dehl bound them with packing tape, beat them and 
questioned them about rings Dehl claimed were missing from a safe at her 
residence. (Tr., Vol. I, p.1270, L.16- p.1274, L.21, p.1279, L.12- p.1288, L.15, 
p.1290, L.17-p.1300, L.5; Tr., Vol. II, p.1495, L.15-p.1496, L.12, p.1497, L.19 
- p.1498, L.14, p.1503, L.3 - p.1519, L.15. 1) During the questioning, someone 
implicated John Schmeichel in the theft of Dehl's rings. (Tr., Vol. I, p.1300, L.6 -
p.1301, L.2, p.1432, Ls.2-18; Tr., Vol. II, p.1519, Ls.16-21.) Hanslovan and 
Huntsman released Kyle from his packing tape restraints and took him with them 
to find John Schmeichel. (Tr., Vol. I, p.1301, L.11 - p.1308, L.11; Tr., Vol. II, 
p.1519, L.22 - p.1520, L.22.) 
1 The state is, contemporaneously with the filing of this brief, filing a motion 
requesting the Idaho Supreme Court to take judicial notice of the clerk's record 
and transcripts filed in Huntsman's prior consolidated appeals, Docket Nos. 
33213 and 33243. Unless otherwise specified, the transcripts cited herein are 
the transcripts that were prepared for ~nd made part of the appellate record in 
Docket Nos. 33213 and 33243. The district court took judicial notice of those 
transcripts in the post-conviction proceedings that are the subject of this appeal. 
(See R., pp.588-90.) 
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When they arrived at the residence where John was staying, Hanslovan 
and Huntsman confronted John about the property that had allegedly been 
stolen from Dehl's safe. (Tr., Vol. I, p.1308, L.12 - p.1310, L.22, p.1745, L.199 -
p.1750, L.11.) John left with Hanslovan, Huntsman and Kyle in Hanslovan's 
vehicle. (Tr., Vol. I, p.1311, Ls.1-16; Tr., Vol. 11, p.1750, Ls.12-15.) While 
Hanslovan was driving the men back to Dehl's residence, Huntsman turned 
around from his position in the front passenger's seat and shot John in the face 
with a .38 caliber revolver, killing him. (Tr., Vol. I, p.1311, L.14 - p.1315, L.24, 
p.1319, L.16 - p.1320, L.25.) When they got back to Dehl's residence, 
Hanslovan and Huntsman enlisted Kyle's help in removing John's body from the 
vehicle and wrapping it in trash bags and a tarp. (Tr., Vol. I., p.1319, Ls.7-9, 
p.1321, Ls.9-10.) A day or two later, Huntsman and Hanslovan drove to Elmore 
County where they and two other individuals dug a shallow grave and buried 
John's body. (Tr., Vol. I, pp.902-1031; Tr., Vol. II, pp.1986, L.4 - p.1987, L.24, 
p.1991, L.3-p.1993, L.18.) 
A grand jury indicted Huntsman in Ada County case number H0500555 on 
one count of first degree murder, one count of using a firearm in the commission 
of the murder, and two counts of kidnapping. (#33213/33243 R., Vol. Ill, pp.403-
05.) Hanslovan was charged, in the same indictment, with two counts of 
kidnapping, two firearm enhancements and one count of trafficking in 
methamphetamine. (#33213/33243 R., Vol. Ill, pp.403-05.) Dehl was charged 
with two counts of kidnapping and one count of trafficking in methamphetamine. 
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(#33213/33243 R., Vol. Ill, pp.403-05.) The district court denied the defendants' 
motions for separate trials, but ordered the drug trafficking charge to be severed 
and tried separately from the murder and kidnapping charges. (#33213/33243 
R., Vol. Ill, pp.410-11, 418; 5/24/05 Tr., p.19, L.8-p.21, L.6.) Huntsman and his 
co-defendants pied not guilty and the case was set for trial on October 11, 2005. 
(#33213/33243 R., Vol. 111, p.440; 5/24/05 Tr., p.25, L.21 - p.26, L.16.) 
At a hearing on September 30, 2005, Dehl and Hanslovan moved to 
continue the trial for the purpose of continuing their investigation. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.66, L.4 - p.76, L.8, p.86, Ls.13-17.) The state joined in the motion, advising 
the court that it had just obtained new evidence. (Tr., Vol. I, p.77, L.1 - p.80, 
L.3.) Specifically, the state advised the court that, on September 29, 2005, one 
of its witnesses had turned over to police the frame and barrel of a .38 caliber 
revolver believed to be the murder weapon. (Tr., Vol. I, p.77, L.23 - p.79, L.23.) 
The state requested that the trial be continued to provide the parties the 
opportunity to investigate and test the newly discovered evidence. (Tr., Vol. I, 
p.77, Ls.1-13, p.79, L.23 - p.80, L.3.) Dehl and Hanslovan concurred with the 
state's request and waived their speedy trial rights. (Tr., Vol. I, p.84, L.1 - p.85, 
L.17.) Huntsman, however, objected to the continuance and declined to waive 
his speedy trial rights. (Tr., Vol. I, p.76, Ls.11-24, p.85, Ls.18-20.) The court 
granted the motion to continue as to Dehl and Hanslovan, but it denied the 
state's request to continue Huntsman's trial. (Tr., Vol. I, p.85, L.21 - p.86, L.2.) 
In doing so, the court rejected the state's assertion that the discovery of the new 
evidence constituted good cause to continue the trial notwithstanding 
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Huntsman's assertion of his statutory speedy trial rights. (Tr., Vol. I, p.80, L.4 -
p.81, L.6.) The court noted, however, that the state did have another course of 
action available to it, that being to "simply dismiss [the charges against 
Huntsman] and then move to consolidate on a refile[d] charge." (Tr., Vol. I, p.81, 
L.21 - p.82, L.2.) 
On October 6, 2005, the state filed a motion to dismiss the charges 
against Huntsman without prejudice. (#33213/33243 R., Vol. Ill, pp.487-88.) 
The district court entered an order granting the motion on October 7, 2005. 
(#33213/33243 R., Vol. Ill, p.492.) 
On October 11, 2005, a grand jury indicted Huntsman in Ada County case 
number H0501438 on one count of first degree murder, one count of using a 
firearm in the commission of the murder, and two counts of kidnapping. 
(#33213/33243 R., Vol. I, pp.9-11.) Over Huntsman's objection, the district court 
granted the state's motion to consolidate Huntsman's case, number H0501438, 
with Dehl's and Hanslovan's case, number H0500555, for trial. (#33213/33243 
R., Vol. I, pp.17-18, 21-22; Tr., Vol. I, p.106, L.7 - p.120, L.3.) The court set the 
trial for April 10, 2006. (Tr., Vol. I, p.126, Ls.14-15, p.127, L.9-p.128, L.2.) 
Prior to trial, the charges against Dehl and Hanslovan in Ada County case 
number H0500555 were resolved by way of plea negotiations with the state. 
(#33213/33243 R., Vol. I, p.72; Tr., Vol. I, p.199, Ls.4-13.) The state proceeded 
to trial against Huntsman in case number H0501438, after which a jury found 
Huntsman guilty as charged. (#33213/33243 R., Vol. II, pp.356-58.) On June 
28, 2006, the district court entered judgment on the jury's verdicts and imposed a 
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unified life sentence with 30 years fixed upon Huntsman's convictions for first-
degree murder and the firearm enhancement, and concurrent unified sentences 
of 20 years with 10 years fixed upon his convictions for kidnapping. 
(#33213/33243 R., Vol. II, pp.381-85.) Huntsman filed a notice of appeal, 
bearing both case numbers H050555 and H0501438, on July 5, 2006. 
(#33213/33243 R., Vol. 11, pp.386-90; #33213/33243 R., Vol. Ill, pp.523-26.) 
Course Of Appellate Proceedings (Consolidated Docket Nos. 33213 and 33243) 
On appeal, Huntsman attempted to challenge the order of dismissal 
entered in case number H050555, claiming the district court erred as a matter of 
law in granting the motion to dismiss, "the dismissal without prejudice resulted in 
a violation of his due process rights," and "the district court judge showed 
partiality by suggesting to the prosecution that it could simply dismiss and re-file 
the charges against [him]." State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 583, 199 P.3d 
155, 158 (Ct. App. 2008) (review denied Jan. 6, 2009). (See also #33213/33243 
Appellant's brief, pp.7-14, 28-40.) The Idaho Court of Appeals held it was 
without jurisdiction to consider any of Huntsman's claims arising out of the 
dismissal of case number H0500555, and therefore declined to address them, 
because Huntsman failed to file a notice of appeal within 42 days of the 
dismissal order. Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 583-84, 199 P.3d at 158-59. 
Regarding case number H0501438, Huntsman argued, inter alia, that the 
prosecution of him in that case violated his state and federal constitutional rights 
to a speedy trial. kl at 584-86, 199 P.3d at 159-61. (See also #33213/33243 
Appellant's brief, pp.14-28.) The Idaho Court of Appeals declined to consider 
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the merits of Huntsman's speedy trial claim, concluding Huntsman had failed to 
preserve the issue for appeal. Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 584-86, 199 P.3d at 159-
61. Specifically, the Court found that, while Huntsman had filed a motion to 
dismiss case number H0501438 based on an alleged speedy trial violation, 
Huntsman's attorney never pursued the motion and, as such, it "was never 
argued to or decided by the [trial] court." kl at 585, 199 P.3d at 160 (footnote 
omitted). There being no adverse ruling to form a basis for Huntsman's 
assignment of error, the Court held the issue was not preserved. kl at 585-86, 
199 P.3d at 160-61. 
Huntsman also argued in connection with case number H0501438 that the 
district court erred by allowing two late disclosed witnesses to testify at trial, 
failing to strike the testimony of two witnesses Huntsman asserted violated the 
court's I.R.E. 615 exclusion orders, and denying his motion for a mistrial made 
after a state's witness made the jury aware that Huntsman was being 
represented by a public defender. & at 586-91, 199 P.3d at 161-66. (See also 
#33213/33243 Appellant's brief, pp.40-64.) The Court of Appeals addressed the 
merits of each of these issues and, ultimately, affirmed Huntsman's convictions. 
Huntsman, 146 Idaho at 586-91, 199 P.3d at 161-66. The Idaho Supreme Court 
denied Huntsman's petition for review on January 6, 2009. (#33213/33243 file 
folder.) A remittitur issued on January 9, 2009. (Id.) 
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Course of Post-Conviction Proceedings (Docket No. 40549) 
On February 20, 2009, Huntsman filed a prose petition for post-conviction 
relief, a supporting affidavit and exhibits, and a motion for the appointment of 
counsel. (R., pp.9-97.) The district court granted the motion for appointment of 
counsel (R., pp.102-03) and, subsequently, entered an order permitting 
Huntsman to file an amended post-conviction petition (R., pp.128-29, 144-45). 
Huntsman filed an amended petition and supporting materials on 
September 30, 2009. (R., pp.156-278.) Relevant to this appeal, the amended 
petition alleged trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely appeal from 
the order of dismissal in case number H0500555 and for failing to pursue the 
speedy trial issue in case number H0501438. (R., pp.159-61.) The amended 
petition also alleged numerous other claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
in the trial and sentencing phases of case number H0501438, as well as a claim 
of newly discovered evidence. (R., pp.161-69.) 
The state answered the amended petition and moved to dismiss it. (R., 
pp.281-304, 435-47.) The state also filed a motion requesting the district court to 
take judicial notice of, inter alia, the clerk's records and transcripts in the 
underlying criminal proceedings. (R., pp.584-87.) The district court granted the 
motion for judicial notice (R., pp.588-90) and, after a hearing, entered a 
memorandum decision and order granting in part and denying in part the state's 
motion for summary dismissal (R., pp.591-616). Specifically, the court granted 
the state's motion for summary dismissal as to all of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims arising out of case number H0501438 - including the claim th.at 
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trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue the speedy trial issue - but 
denied the motion as to Huntsman's newly discovered evidence claim and his 
claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely appeal from the 
order of dismissal in case number H0500555. (Id.) 
Following an evidentiary hearing on the two remaining claims in the 
amended petition, the district court dismissed Huntsman's newly discovered 
evidence claim on the basis that Huntsman failed to prove the claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence. (#40549 Tr., p.206, L.24 - p.208, L.12; R., 
pp.704-08.) The court raised on its own motion the question of whether it even 
had jurisdiction to entertain Huntsman's claim that trial counsel was ineffective 
for failing to file an appeal from the order of dismissal in case number H0500555. 
(#40549 Tr., p.203, L.4 - p.204, L.16, p.208, L.13 - p.209, L.10, p.212, Ls.8-13, 
p.214, L.20 - p.219, L.6.) The court explained: 
In looking at the Postconviction Procedure Act, and 
specifically that is Idaho Code [§] 19-4601 et seq., -- correction, 
4901 et seq., in that case the language there as to the type of 
actions that may be brought pursuant to the Postconviction 
Procedure Act are for convictions. 
Everything that I have read in the statute itself, everything 
that I have researched in the case authority indicates that the 
Postconviction Procedure Act and the ability of the Court to grant 
postconviction relief pursuant to its terms concerns convictions that 
have entered and not dismissals. 
(#40549 Tr., p.218, Ls.1-13.) The court gave the parties notice of its intent to 
summarily dismiss the "application for postconviction relief at least as it relate[d) 
to the failure to appeal the 555-case" on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain that claim. (#40549 Tr., p.218, L.24 - p.219, L.18.) 
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After the court gave notice of its intent to summarily dismiss the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim arising out of case number H0500555, the state 
moved to amend its answer to assert as an affirmative defense that the petition 
was not timely from the dismissal of case number H0500555. (#40549 Tr., 
p.222, L.12 - p.223, L.6.) The court deferred ruling on the requested 
amendment and permitted the parties to brief both the issues of the court's 
jurisdiction and the timeliness of the petition as it related to case number 
H0500555. (#40549 Tr., p.219, L.7 - p.221, L.18, p.223, L.16 - p.224, L.23.) 
Following briefing and another hearing (see generally R., pp.709-22; 
#40549 Tr., pp.229-42), the district court entered a memorandum decision and 
order summarily dismissing Huntsman's claim that trial counsel was ineffective 
for not timely appealing the order of dismissal in case number H0500555 (R., 
pp.724-30). The court ruled it lacked jurisdiction under the UPCPA to entertain 
the claim because it arose from the dismissal of a criminal action, not from a 
conviction. (R., pp.727-28.) Alternatively, the court ruled the claim - which was 
filed more than three years after entry of the order dismissing case number 
H0500555 - was untimely. (R., pp.726-27.) The district court entered a final 




Huntsman states the issues on appeal as: 
I. 
Whether the district court erred when it denied post-conviction relief 
on the failure to appeal issue because it erroneously ruled that it 
had no jurisdiction to grant the requested relief. 
11. 
Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed the 
claim that counsel failed to preserve the speedy trial issue because 
it erroneously ruled that there was not a reasonable probability that 
said claim would have been meritorious. 
(Appellant's brief, p. 7.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Huntsman failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a timely notice of appeal 
from the order of dismissal in case number H0500555 because the claim 
was itself jurisdictionally barred or, alternatively, not timely raised in the 
UPCPA proceeding? 
2. Has Huntsman failed to show error in the district court's finding that he 
failed to establish a material issue of fact entitling him to an evidentiary 
hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not pursuing the 




Huntsman Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim 
That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Filing A Timely Notice Of Appeal 
From The Order Of Dismissal In Case Number H0500555 
A. Introduction 
Huntsman's amended post-conviction petition alleged trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file a timely appeal from the district court's order of 
dismissal in case number H0500555. (R., pp.159-61.) The district court 
summarily dismissed this claim on two alternative bases. First, the court held it 
was without jurisdiction to entertain the claim because the remedies afforded by 
the UPCPA are available only to persons who have been convicted of or 
sentenced for a crime, not to persons whose criminal cases have been 
dismissed. (R., pp.727-28.) Alternatively, the court held the claim was time-
barred because it was filed more than three years after the entry of the dismissal 
order in case number H0500555. (R., pp.726-27.) Contrary to Huntsman's 
assertions on appeal, correct application of the law to the facts of this case 
supports the district court's rulings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
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1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law, given free review. 
State v. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003). The 
interpretation and construction of a statute also present questions of law over 
which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 
796,798,102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004). 
C. The District Court Correctly Held It Was Without Jurisdiction To Entertain 
Huntsman's Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To 
Timely Appeal The Order Of Dismissal In Case Number H0500555 
Huntsman alleged in his amended post-conviction petition that trial 
counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file a notice of appeal from the order 
of dismissal in case number H0500555. (R., pp.159-60.) As a remedy for the 
alleged violation, Huntsman asked the district court to reenter the dismissal order 
and reinstate his right to appeal. (R., p.160; #40549 Tr., p.203, L.4 - p.204, 
L.13.) The district court ruled it was without jurisdiction to grant the requested 
relief because its jurisdiction over the criminal case expired 42 days after entry of 
the dismissal order, and the provisions of the UPCPA - which by its plain terms 
affords relief from convictions and sentences, not dismissals - did not extend 
that jurisdiction. (R., pp.727-28.) The district court was correct. 
It is well settled that a "trial court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a 
judgment expires once the judgment becomes final, either by expiration of the 
time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 
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Idaho 352, 354, 79 P.3d 711, 713 (2003), quoted in State v. Johnson, 152 Idaho 
41, 47, 266 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2011). Where, as in case number H0500555, a 
trial court enters an order dismissing the criminal case, the dismissal "is 
tantamount to a judgment and is final 42 days later, when the time for appeal 
runs." Johnson, 152 Idaho at 47, 266 P.3d at 1152 (citing I.AR. 11 (c)(4), 14(a)). 
"Jurisdiction of a criminal matter thus expires 42 days after the district court 
dismisses the case unless an appeal or some statute or rule extends that 
jurisdiction." lg_,_ 
In this case, Huntsman attempted to invoke the provisions of the UPCPA, 
I. C. § 19-4901, et seq., as the basis for extending the court's jurisdiction to 
reenter the order of dismissal in case number H0500555. As found by the 
district court, however, the plain language of I.C. § 19-4901 (a) provides that the 
remedies afforded under the UPCPA are available only to persons who have 
"been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime." Other provisions of the UPCPA 
similarly make clear that a court's authority to grant post-conviction relief from an 
otherwise final criminal proceeding is limited to criminal cases in which there was 
a conviction or sentence. See I.C. §§ 19-4902 (post-conviction "proceeding is 
commenced by filing an application verified by the applicant with the clear of the 
district court in which the conviction took place"), 19-4903 (post-conviction 
application must "identify the proceedings in which the applicant was convicted" 
and "give the date of the entry of the judgment and sentence complained of'), 
19-4907(a) ("If the court finds in favor of the applicant, it shall enter an 
appropriate order with respect to the conviction or sentence in the former 
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proceedings .... "). Nowhere in the statutory scheme is there arJy indication that a 
court has jurisdiction to grant relief in a criminal case in which the charges have 
been finally dismissed. 
It is axiomatic and long-established that a statute will be interpreted 
according to its plain language and that where the language is plain the court will 
not resort to principles of statutory construction. State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 
360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003); State v. McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365, 913 
P.2d 578, 581 (1996); see also Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical 
Center, 151 Idaho 889, 895-96, 265 P. 3d 502, 508-09 (2011) (if the plain 
language of a statute is capable of only one reasonable interpretation, it is the 
Court's duty to give the statute that interpretation). Because the provisions of the 
UPCPA unambiguously limit a court's authority to grant post-conviction relief 
from a conviction or sentence, the district court correctly determined it was 
without jurisdiction to grant Huntsman relief from the order of dismissal in case 
number H0500555. (See R., p.728.) 
Huntsman argues on appeal that, by dismissing the ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim arising out of case number H0500555 for lack of jurisdiction, the 
"district court misunderstood the nature of the claim, the [UPCPA], and its full 
authority." (Appellant's brief, p.16.) Although recognizing the relief he sought 
was the reentry of the order of dismissal and reinstatement of his appellate rights 
in case number H0500555, Huntsman nevertheless maintains that his "challenge 
is to a conviction, not a dismissal." (Id.) Specifically, Huntsman contends he "is 
not abstractly challenging his counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal in the 
14 
original case" or even "complaining his rights were violated in a case which was 
dismissed and never re-filed," but is instead "asserting that his conviction and 
imprisonment for the crimes of murder and kidnapping are in violation of the 
Constitution because he received ineffective assistance from the counsel who 
represented him in the trial court on those charges." (Id., pp.16-17.) The fatal 
flaw in Huntsman's argument is that it fails to recognize that the case in which he 
was convicted - case number H0501438 - was an entirely separate criminal 
proceeding than case number H0500555. See State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 
580, 583-84, 199 P.3d 155, 158-59 (Ct. App. 2008) (rejecting Huntsman's 
assertion that re-filing of identical charges in case number H0501438 had effect 
of "resurrecting" case number H0500555 and making it "part of the second 
[case]" (brackets original)). While the court clearly had jurisdiction under the 
UPCPA to entertain the ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising directly 
out of counsel's representation of Huntsman in the case in which he was actually 
convicted, the court correctly concluded that nothing in the UPCPA conferred 
upon it authority to grant Huntsman's request for relief in an entirely separate 
case in which the charges against Huntsman had been dismissed. 
Huntsman correctly points out that, under the UPCPA and established 
case law, the remedy for trial counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal from a 
judgment of conviction is reentry of the judgment and reinstatement of the right 
to appeal. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-20 (citing Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191, 
195, 657 P.2d 488, 492 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Dillard, 110 Idaho 834, 837-38, 
718 P.2d 1272, 1275-76 (Ct. App. 1986).) Huntsman argues that, "[b]y the same 
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logic, the remedy for failure to file an appeal from a dismissal should be re-entry 
of the order of dismissal." (Appellant's brief, p.18.) To support this claim, 
Huntsman relies on the Idaho Supreme Court's statement in State v. Johnson, 
152 Idaho 41, 266 P.3d 1146 (2011 ), that "[a] district court's dismissal of a 
criminal case is tantamount to a judgment and is final 42 days later, when the 
time for appeal runs." That an order of dismissal is "tantamount to a judgment" 
for purposes of determining the finality of the criminal action does not compel the 
conclusion, suggested by Huntsman, that such dismissal order is subject to 
collateral attack under the provisions of the UPCPA. Again, the UPCPA very 
clearly provides that post-conviction remedies are available only to persons who 
have been "convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime." I.C. § 19-4901 (a). A 
judgment of dismissal, while clearly a final appealable order, is the antithesis of a 
criminal conviction or sentence and, as such, does not fall within the types of 
orders from which the court can grant relief under the UPCPA. 
Citing I.C. § 19-4907(a), Huntsman next argues the district court had 
authority "to enter whatever order" it deemed "necessary and proper" to remedy 
any prejudiced Huntsman suffered as a result of counsel's failure to file a timely 
notice of appeal case number H0500555, regardless of the fact that the case 
was dismissed. (Appellant's brief, pp.19-21.) Huntsman's argument is without 
merit. Idaho Code § 19-4907(a) specifically states that, "[i]f the court finds in 
favor of the applicant, it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the 
conviction or sentence in the former proceedings, and any supplementary orders 
as to rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail, discharge, correction of sentence, or 
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other matters that may be necessary and proper." (Emphasis added). Pursuant 
to the plain language of this statute, the court's ability to enter necessary and 
proper orders as to matters other than conviction and sentence is specifically 
contingent on there actually being a conviction or sentence in the former 
proceeding from which the relief is being sought. Such is not surprising since, 
under I.C. § 19-4901 (a), only those persons who have been "convicted of, or 
sentenced for, a crime" are entitled to relief under the UPCPA. 
In a final argument, Huntsman appears to contend that, regardless of 
whether he was convicted in case number H0500555, the district court had 
authority under "the constitutional . . . and/or common law remedy of habeas 
corpus" to grant the requested relief because "[t]he writ of habeas corpus has 
always been able to remedy illegal custody." (Appellant's brief, pp.21-23.) 
Huntsman's argument fails for at least two reasons. 
First, as Huntsman acknowledges, the common law remedy of habeas 
corpus has been subsumed by the UPCPA. (See Appellant's brief, pp.21-22 
(citing Dionne v. State, 93 Idaho 235, 459 P.2d 1017 (1969)). Because, as 
repeatedly stated above, the remedies under the UPCPA are available only to 
persons who have been "convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime," I.C. § 19-
4901 (a), the district court did not have jurisdiction in the post-conviction case to 
grant Huntsman's request for relief from the order of dismissal in case number 
H0500555. To the extent Huntsman now claims there is some free-standing 
right to habeas relief that is broader in scope than the relief afforded by the 
UPCPA, Huntsman has failed to cite any authority to support such a claim and 
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has therefore waived consideration of it on appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 
259, 263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996). 
Second, even assuming the trial court had authority under the writ of 
habeas corpus to "remedy illegal custody," it could not do so in relation to case 
number H0500555 because Huntsman is not in custody on that case. Rather, 
Huntsman's custodial status is a direct result of his conviction in case number 
H0501438. 
The district court correctly concluded it was without jurisdiction under the 
UPCPA to grant relief on Huntsman's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a timely notice of appeal from the order of dismissal in case number 
H0500555. Having failed either below or on appeal to identify any statute or rule 
that would extend the court's jurisdiction to order the requested relief, Huntsman 
has failed to show any basis for reversal of the court's order summarily 
dismissing the claim for lack of jurisdiction. 
D. Alternatively, The District Court Correctly Dismissed The Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel Claim Arising Out Of Case Number H0500555 
Because Huntsman Failed To File The Claim Within The Time Limits 
Prescribed By The UPCPA 
Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires that a post-conviction proceeding be 
commenced by filing a petition "any time within one (1) year from the expiration 
of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or from the 
determination of proceedings following an appeal, whichever is later." Absent a 
showing by the petitioner that the one-year statute of limitation should be tolled, 
the failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for dismissal 
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of the petition. Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001 ); Sayas 
v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003). 
The district court entered its order dismissing the prosecution against 
Huntsman in case number H0500555 on October 7, 2005. (#33213/33243 R., 
Vol. Ill, p.492.) Huntsman did not file a timely notice of appeal from the order of 
dismissal and, as such, the dismissal became final 42 days later, on November 
18, 2005. See State v. Jghnson, 152 Idaho 41, 47,266 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2011) 
("A district court's dismissal of a criminal case is tantamount to a judgment and is 
final 42 days later, when the time for appeal runs."). Huntsman's untimely notice 
of appeal, filed on July 5, 2006, did not extend the limitation period of I.C. § 19-
4902(a) for filing any claims for post-conviction relief arising out of case number 
H0500555. See Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 385, 256 P.3d 791, 793 (Ct. 
App. 2011) ("An untimely notice of appeal in the criminal case cannot postpone 
the commencement of the limitation period because a time-barred notice of 
appeal does not confer jurisdiction on the appellate courts and, thus, there is no 
valid appeal for an appellate court to 'determine' that could extend the post-
conviction statute of limitation under I.C. § 19-4902(a)."). Therefore, to be timely 
as to any issues arising out of case number H0500555, Huntsman's post-
conviction petition must have been filed on or before November 18, 2006 - one 
year from the expiration of Huntsman's time to appeal the order dismissing case 
number H0500555 without prejudice. I.C. § 19-4902(a). Huntsman did not file 
his post-conviction petition until February 20, 2009 (R., p.9), more than three 
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years after the order of dismissal in case number H0500555 became final, and 
more than two years after the limitation period of I.C. § 19-4902(a) had expired. 
Because Huntsman did not file his post-conviction petition within one year 
of the final determination of case number H0500555, the claim in the petition that 
trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a timely notice of appeal from the order 
of dismissal in case number H0500555 was untimely on its face and was subject 
to summary dismissal unless Huntsman alleged facts sufficient to establish a 
prima facie case for equitable tolling. On appeal, Huntsman appears to argue 
that the limitation period should have been tolled because, he contends, "the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to appeal was not ripe until 
the Court of Appeals held that the appellate issues from the original case were 
not preserved, which occurred more than one year and 42 days after the order of 
dismissal." (Appellant's brief, p.23.) Huntsman did not allege this "ripeness" 
claim as a basis for equitable tolling in either his amended post-conviction 
petition or in response to the district court's notice of intent to dismiss (see R., 
pp.159-60, 720) and, as such, it is not properly before this Court. !;&_, Small v. 
State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998) (declining to 
consider for first time on appeal claims not raised in post-conviction petition). 
Even if he had, the claim would not have been sufficient to make out a prima 
facie case for equitable tolling. 
As far as the state can discern, Huntsman's argument that the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim arising out of case number H0500555 was not "ripe" 
until the Court of Appeals issued its opinion in State v. Huntsman, 146 Idaho 
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580, 199 P.3d 155 (Ct. App. 2008), is really an argument that Huntsman could 
not have known trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely notice of 
appeal until the Court of Appeals announced in its opinion that it would not 
consider any issues arising out of case number H0500555 because Huntsman 
failed to file a timely notice of appeal in that case. (See Appellant's brief, pp.23-
24.) In addition to being hopelessly circular, this argument is both legally and 
factually incorrect and fails to establish any basis for equitable tolling. 
Idaho recognizes equitable tolling in limited circumstances, including 
where there are "'claims which simply [were] not known to the defendant within 
the time limit, yet raise important due process issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 
Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 
Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)). The time for raising claims involving 
important due process issues may be tolled until the discovery of the violation. 
& at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070 (citing Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 904, 174 P.3d at 
874). Even claims raising important due process issues are deemed waived, 
however, if not brought within a reasonable time of when the claims were known 
or should have been known. & Regarding ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims, the Idaho Supreme Court has "repeatedly held" that such "claims can or 
should be known after trial." & at 253, 220 P.3d at 1072. Accordingly, the one-
year statute of limitation for bringing ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
generally starts running immediately from the date the judgment - or, in this 
case, order of dismissal - becomes final. &, 148 Idaho at 253, 220 P.3d at 
1072. 
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Applying these well-settled legal principles to the facts of this case shows 
Huntsman has failed to show any basis for equitable tolling. When the district 
court entered the order of dismissal in case number H0500555, Idaho law very 
clearly provided that, to be timely, any notice of appeal from the order of 
dismissal must have been filed within 42 days. See I.AR. 11 (c)(3) (order 
granting motion to dismiss an information is appealable as a matter of right); 
I.AR. 11(c)(4) (any order terminating criminal action is appealable as a matter of 
right); I.AR. 14 (appeal as a matter of right from judgment or final order in a 
criminal action must be filed within 42 days). Idaho law also very clearly 
provided that a timely notice of appeal is a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction. 
See I.AR. 21; State v. Payan, 128 Idaho 866, 867, 920 P.2d 82, 83 (Ct. App. 
1996). Huntsman's claim became "ripe" when his counsel did not file an appeal 
within 42 days of the order of dismissal, not when the Court of Appeals 
concluded it did not have appellate jurisdiction over that order. The factual basis 
of Huntsman's ineffective assistance of counsel claim - that trial counsel did not 
file an appeal within 42 days of the October 7, 2005 order of dismissal in case 
number H0500555 - was or reasonably should have been known to Huntsman 
no later than November 2005. Bringing the claim in February 2009, when the 
facts underlying the claim were known to Huntsman in November 2005, is simply 
not reasonable under the applicable law. See Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 253, 220 
P .3d at 1072 ("The facts of the case, being particularly within the knowledge of 
the defendant should be sufficient to alert a defendant to the presence of 
ineffective assistance of counsel."). 
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Because Huntsman failed to bring his ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim arising out of case number H0500555 within the one-year limitation period 
of I.C. § 19-4902, and because he failed to allege any facts to establish a basis 
for equitable tolling, he has failed to show any basis for reversal of the district 
court's order summarily dismissing that claim as untimely. 
II. 
Huntsman Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claim 
That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Not Pursuing The Motion To Dismiss The 
Indictment In Case Number H0501438 For An Alleged Speedy Trial Violation 
A. Introduction 
Huntsman alleged in his amended post-conviction petition that trial 
counsel was ineffective for not pursuing a motion to dismiss the indictment in 
case number H0501438 for an alleged speedy trial viola!ion, thereby failing to 
preserve the speedy trial issue for appeal. (R., pp.160-61.) The district court 
summarily dismissed this claim, concluding Huntsman failed to demonstrate a 
reasonable probability that such motion would have been meritorious and, 
therefore, failed to "raise[] an issue of fact as to whether [trial counsel's] failure to 
fully prosecute the motion to dismiss constituted deficient performance." (R., 
pp.598-600.) Contrary to Huntsman's arguments on appeal, a review of the 
record and the applicable law supports the district court's ruling. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851,852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
C. Huntsman Failed To Make A Prima Facie Showing That, If Pursued, The 
Motion To Dismiss Case Number H0501438 Based On An Alleged 
Speedy Trial Violation Would Have Been Granted 
"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject 
to summary dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of 
material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's claims. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. "Allegations contained in the 
application are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly 
disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as 
a matter of law." Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802. 
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In order to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 
(1989). When a post-conviction petitioner claims his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a motion, "the district court may consider the probability of success 
of the motion in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity 
constituted incompetent performance." Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 
P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 
927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct. App.1996)). "Where the alleged deficiency is counsel's 
failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have 
been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the 
Strickland test." kl at 67-68, 266 P.3d at 1172-73. 
Huntsman's trial counsel filed a motion to dismiss case number 
H0501438, asserting in conclusory fashion that the state, by dismissing and re-
filing the charges against Huntsman, "intentionally violated his Constitutional and 
statutory rights to a speedy trial." (#33213/33243 R., Vol. I, pp.32-33.) Trial 
counsel never sought or obtained a ruling on the motion, however, and, as a 
result, forfeited consideration of the issue on Huntsman's direct appeal. See 
Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 584-86, 199 P.3d at 159-61 (declining to address 
merits of Huntsman's claim of a constitutional speedy trial violation, finding issue 
not preserved due to failure of counsel to obtain a ruling on motion to dismiss). 
As he did below, Huntsman now claims there is a reasonable probability that, 
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had the constitutional speedy trial arguments been pursued, they "would have 
been meritorious at the trial or appellate level, and thus counsel's failure to 
preserve the speedy trial issue was cognizable ineffective assistance of 
counsel."2 (Appellant's brief, pp.27-28.) Review of the record and the applicable 
law shows Huntsman is incorrect. 
"Both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 
1, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantee to criminal defendants the right to a 
speedy trial." State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 352, 160 P.3d 1284, 1287 (Ct. 
App. 2007). When analyzing claims of speedy trial violations under the state and 
federal constitutions, the Idaho appellate courts utilize the four-part balancing 
test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 
514 (1972). State v. Young, 136 Idaho 113, 117, 29 P.3d 949, 953 (2001); 
Lopez, 144 Idaho at 352, 160 P.3d at 1288; State v. Avila, 143 Idaho 849, 853, 
153 P.3d 1195, 1199 (Ct. App. 2006). The factors to be considered are: (1) the 
length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of 
2 Citing his Appellant's brief in consolidated Docket Nos. 33213 and 33214, 
Huntsman contends he also argued to the district court in the post-conviction 
proceeding that the dismissal and re-filing of the charges against him violated his 
due process rights and that the district court failed to address those claims. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.26-27.) The state agrees these arguments were contained 
in Huntsman's original appellate briefing, which was attached as an exhibit to 
Huntsman's brief in opposition to the state's motion for summary dismissal. (See 
R., pp.496-508.) Contrary to Huntsman's assertions, however, the due process 
issues were raised in the amended post-conviction petition and supporting 
materials as part and parcel of Huntsman's claim that trial counsel was 
ineffective for not filing a timely notice of appeal in case number H0500555. 
(See R., pp.159-60, 451-53.) Huntsman did not allege or argue any due process 
violations in connection with his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing 
to pursue the speedy trial issue in case number H0501438. (See R., pp.160-61, 
455-56.) 
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his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) the prejudice occasioned by the delay. 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. Although Huntsman argues otherwise, balancing of 
these factors in this case supports the district court's determination that 
Huntsman would not have prevailed on his claim of a constitutional speedy trial 
violation, either in the trial court or on appeal. 
1. The Length Of The Delay, While Sufficient To Trigger Balancing, 
Does Not Weigh In Huntsman's Favor 
"The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until 
there is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for 
inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." Barker, 407 U.S. at 530. 
For purposes of the Sixth Amendment, "the period of delay is measured from the 
date there is 'a formal indictment or information or else the actual restraints 
imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge."' Lopez, 144 Idaho 
at 352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 
(1971); Young, 136 Idaho at 117, 29 P.3d at 953.) "Similarly, under the Idaho 
Constitution, the period of delay is measured from the date formal charges are 
filed or the defendant is arrested, whichever occurs first." Lopez, 144 Idaho at 
352, 160 P.3d at 1287 (citations omitted). Once the balancing test is triggered, 
the length of delay also becomes a factor in and of itself. Avila, 143 Idaho at 
853, 153 P.3d at 1199. 
It is undisputed that Huntsman was arrested on March 24, 2005, and the 
state brought him to trial on April 10, 2006. (See R., p.599; Appellant's brief, 
p.30.) Subtracting the four-day period between the dismissal of the charges in 
case number H0500555 on October 7, 2005, and the re-filing of charges in case 
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number H0501438 on October 11, 2005, the state agrees with Huntsman that 
the total period of delay in bringing him to trial was approximately 12 ½ months. 
See State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828, 842, 118 P.3d 160, 174 (Ct. App. 2005) 
(citing United States v. McDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982)) ("The constitutional 
speedy trial guarantee does not protect any delay in refilling criminal charges 
after charges have been dismissed."). 
The state concedes that the delay of just over 12 months is sufficient to 
trigger the Barker balancing test - but not by much. See State v. Campbell, 104 
Idaho 705, 708, 662 P.2d 1149, 1152 (Ct. App. 1983) (citing State v. Talmage, 
104 Idaho 249, 252, 658 P.2d 920, 923 (1983)) ("A delay of [approximately 12 
months] is sufficient to trigger an inquiry into whether speedy trial has been 
denied."). As noted in Barker, the reasonableness of length of the delay must be 
evaluated in light of the nature of the offense for which the defendant is standing 
trial: "[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is 
considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge." Barker, 407 
U.S. 531. Considering the nature of the charges on which Huntsman was 
standing trial - first degree murder, a firearm enhancement, and two counts of 
kidnapping - the length of the delay was not substantial and does not weigh 
heavily in Huntsman's favor. See State v. Ciccone, 145 Idaho 330, _, 297 
P.3d 1147, 1156 (Ct. App. 2012) (review denied) (delay of nearly 12 months from 
filing of information to trial was "not as significant, given that the nature of the 
charges Ciccone was facing - two counts of first degree murder - can be fairly 
I 
characterized as complex."). 
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Moreover, the length of the delay is not dispositive. None of the four 
Barker factors is by itself "either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding 
of a deprivation of the right of speedy trial." Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. Because, 
for the reasons set forth in more detail below, there were valid reasons for the 
delay, and because Huntsman was not unfairly prejudiced by the delay, the 
length of the delay should be excused. 
2. The Discovery Of New Evidence Constituted A Valid Reason For 
The Delay 
Implicit in the standards applicable to claims of constitutional speedy trial 
violations is the recognition that "pretrial delay is often both inevitable and wholly 
justifiable." Avila, 143 Idaho at 853, 153 P.3d at 1199 (citing Doggett v. United 
States, 505 U.S. 647,656 (1992)); State v. Davis, 141 Idaho 828,837, 118 P.3d 
160, 169 (Ct. App. 2005) (same). For that reason, different weights are assigned 
to different reasons for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. As explained by the 
Supreme Court: 
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the 
defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A 
more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts 
should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be 
considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances 
must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. 
Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing witness, should serve to 
justify appropriate delay. 
kl at 531 (footnote omitted). 
The state agrees with Huntsman that, "[i]n our case, the reason for the 
delay is clear[;] the state wanted to test, evaluate, and admit the gun that they 
believed was the murder weapon." (Appellant's brief, p.34.) Although Huntsman 
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urges this Court to equate the state's desire to actually present its case on the 
merits with an attempt to delay the trial in order to gain an unfair tactical 
advantage over him (see Appellant's brief, pp.34-39), there is no basis in law or 
fact to do so. Absent a showing of bad faith, it is perfectly proper for the state to 
dismiss and re-file charges for the purpose of continuing the trial to present 
witnesses and evidence that might not have otherwise been available to it in the 
first prosecution. See State v. Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 885, 135 P.3d 350, 356 
(Ct. App. 2006) (newly discovered evidence seized from defendant's home 
"constitute[d] a sufficient basis to dismiss and re-file charges"); Davis, 141 Idaho 
at 843, 118 P.3d at 175 (state did not act with improper motive to delay in order 
to gain a tactical advantage when it dismissed and re-filed charges to 
accommodate witnesses' vacation schedules). Here, there simply is no 
indication that the state acted in bad faith. In fact, in requesting a continuance of 
the original case, the state was not only concerned with its own ability to evaluate 
and test the newly discovered murder weapon, it also specifically recognized the 
defense's interest in evaluating the weapon, as well. (Tr., Vol. I, p.79, L.23 -
p.80, L.3.) Thus, far from demonstrating a desire by the state to somehow gain 
a tactical advantage over Huntsman, the record actually shows that the state 
sought the delay in the interest of fairness to all of the parties involved. 
In an apparent attempt to demonstrate bad faith, Huntsman argues the 
state dismissed and re-filed the charges against him in a deliberate attempt to 
"defeat" his statutory speedy trial rights. (Appellant's brief, p.34.) Huntsman is 
incorrect. Faced with the denial of its motion for a continuance in case number 
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H0500555, the state had two options available to it: 1) proceed to trial against 
Huntsman without the murder weapon - evidence that was clearly important, 
relevant, and otherwise admissible in light of the fact that Huntsman was 
charged with murder, or 2) dismiss the case and thereby provide Huntsman the 
remedy to which he was entitled by statute for the failure to bring him to trial 
within six months. See I.C. § 19-3501 (remedy for failure to bring defendant to 
trial within six months is dismissal). The state chose the latter option and, in so 
doing, actually honored Huntsman's statutory speedy trial rights. That the state 
subsequently re-filed identical charges against Huntsman in case number 
H0501438 does not even suggest the state acted in bad faith. Idaho Code§ 19-
3506 specifically provides that a dismissal granted under I.C. § 19-3501 is not a 
bar to any other prosecution for the same offense if the offense is a felony. 
Nor has Huntsman shown from the record that the state deliberately 
"delayed the trial in order to hinder the defense by getting around the discovery 
deadline" in case number H0500555 (Appellant's brief, p.34.) While it is true 
that the trial court had entered an order excluding certain fingerprint and ballistic 
evidence because the state missed the discovery deadline in case number 
H0500555 (see #33213/33243 R., Vol. Ill, p.459), there is no evidence in the 
record to suggest that the state deliberately sought to delay the trial for the 
purpose of circumventing the court's order. Rather, as Huntsman points out, 
until the discovery of the murder weapon two weeks before trial, the state was 
prepared to go to trial, even without the excluded evidence. (Appellant's brief, 
p.35.) And, as discussed in more detail in section 11.C.4, infra, there is no 
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evidence Huntsman's defense was actually hampered by the introduction of the 
evidence at trial. 
Ultimately, Huntsman's claims both below and on appeal boil down to his 
assertion that "the reason for the delay was so the state could produce more and 
better evidence against" him. (Appellant's brief, pp.34-39). Even assuming the 
truth of this assertion, Huntsman has failed to cite any authority for the 
proposition the desire of the state to present a strong case, based on all of the 
admissible evidence available to it, was an invalid reason for the delay in 
bringing him to trial. While Huntsman undoubtedly would have preferred for the 
state to have proceeded to trial as quickly as possible and without the murder 
weapon, the district court correctly concluded that the "desire of the State to 
further investigate this evidence, rather than simply ignore it, [was) reasonable." 
(R., p.599.) 
3. Huntsman Timely Asserted His Speedy Trial Rights 
The third factor in the Barker analysis is whether and how the defendant 
asserted his right to a speedy trial. A defendant's assertion of his right is 
"entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether the defendant is 
being deprived of the right." Barker, 407 U.S. at 531-32; Davis, 141 Idaho 839, 
118 P .3d at 171. "[F]ailure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant 
to prove that he was denied a speedy trial." kl 
Huntsman asserted his speedy trial rights at the September 30, 2005 
hearing on the state's motion to continue his trial in case number H0500555 and 
again in the motion to dismiss filed in case number H0501438. (R., pp.598-99.) 
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Because the issue in this case is whether trial counsel was ineffective for not 
pursuing the motion to dismiss based on an alleged speedy trial violation, the 
state will assume that, had the motion been pursued, the third Barker factor 
would weigh in Huntsman's favor. 
4. Huntsman Was Not Unfairly Preiudiced By The Delay 
The final and most important factor in the Barker analysis is the nature 
and extent of any prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the delay. 
Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354, 160 P.3d at 1289; Davis, 141 
Idaho at 840, 118 P.3d at 172. As explained by the Idaho Supreme Court: 
Prejudice is to be assessed in light of the interests of defendants 
which the right to a speedy trial is designed to protect. Those 
interests are ( 1) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to 
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused, and (3) to limit the 
possibility that the defense will be impaired. 
Young, 136 Idaho at 118, 29 P.3d at 954 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). 
Accord Lopez, 144 Idaho at 354-55, 160 P.3d at 1289-90; Avila, 143 Idaho at 
854, 153 P.3d at 1200; Davis, 141 Idaho at 840, 118 P.3d at 172. "The third of 
these is the most significant because a hindrance to adequate preparation of the 
defense 'skews the fairness of the entire system."' Lopez, 144 Idaho at 355, 160 
P.3d at 1290 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 532; State v. Hernandez, 133 Idaho 576, 
583, 990 P.2d 742, 749 (Ct. App. 1999)). 
There is no question that Huntsman was continuously incarcerated in jail 
for just over 12 months while awaiting trial, and during that time he undoubtedly 
felt the anxiety and concern that any incarcerated individual would suffer. 
Despite Huntsman's argument to the contrary, however, there simply is no 
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evidence in the record to support his claim that his defense was actually 
impaired by the delay. 
Huntsman claims to have been prejudiced because, after the state 
dismissed and re-filed the charges against him, the court reset the discovery 
deadlines and, as a result, the state was allowed to present witnesses and 
evidence in the second prosecution that it would not have been permitted to in 
the first. (Appellant's brief, pp.40-41.). Specifically, in addition to introducing the 
murder weapon and testimony relating to analyses of it, the state was also 
permitted to introduce fingerprint and ballistic evidence that the court had 
ordered excluded in the first prosecution because the state had missed the 
discovery deadline. (See #33213/33243 R., p.459.) The state was also able to 
present at trial the testimony of a witness, Steve Davis, whom it did not discover 
until after the charges were re-filed. (Tr., Vol. II, pp.2361-2364, pp.2380-2395, 
p.2668, L.20 - p.2669, L.7.) Again, it is important to note there is no evidence to 
the record to suggest that the state dismissed and re-field the charges for the 
purpose of circumventing the court's discovery order or for any other bad faith 
purpose. More importantly, however, Huntsman has failed to demonstrate from 
the record that he was actually prejudiced in any legally cognizable sense by the 
introduction of the evidence at trial. 
The district court excluded the ballistic and fingerprint evidence in the first 
prosecution because the late disclosure of that evidence deprived Huntsman of a 
meaningful opportunity to evaluate the evidence and prepare to meet it at trial. 
(See, generally, Tr. Vol. I, p.412 (trial court explaining, in subsequent 
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prosecution, that the underlying purpose of the discovery deadlines contained in 
the court's order governing proceedings "was to force meaningful preparation" 
for trial).) Huntsman did not suffer similar prejudice in the second prosecution, 
however, because he had a meaningful opportunity to prepare to meet the 
evidence at trial. Although Huntsman understandably would have preferred for 
the state not to have presented evidence that tended to show his guilt, he has 
failed to show from the record that the introduction of such evidence actually 
implicated his right to a fair trial or impaired his ability to present a defense. See 
Davis, 141 Idaho 842-43, 118 P.3d at 174-75. To the contrary, the record shows 
that Huntsman's counsel was prepared to meet all of the fingerprint and ballistic 
evidence, as he thoroughly cross-examined the witnesses who testified about 
those subjects, including Steve Davis, and even presented his own expert to 
rebut the testimony of the state's expert regarding the murder weapon. (Tr., Vol. 
II, pp.2396-2419, pp.2586-2598, pp.2694-2729.) The district court thus correctly 
concluded that Huntsman was not prejudiced by the delay. 
5. A Balancing Of The Barker Factors Weighs Against A Finding Of A 
Speedy Trial Violation 
The four Barker factors, together with any other relevant circumstances, 
must be balanced and weighed to determine whether an individual's right to a 
speedy trial was violated. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533. In this case, although the 
length of the delay was sufficient to trigger a constitutional analysis, the 
remaining factors, on balance, weigh against a finding of a speedy trial violation. 
The state sought the delay for a valid reason and, although Huntsman asserted 
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his speedy trial rights, he cannot demonstrate from the record that he was 
unfairly prejudiced by the delay. In short, there is no reasonable probability that 
the motion to dismiss based on an alleged speedy trial violation would have 
succeeded on the merits had counsel pursued it. The district court thus correctly 
dismissed Huntsman's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not pursuing 
the issue and preserving it for appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the court's orders summarily dismissing Huntsman's amended petition for 
post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 18th day of October 2013. 
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